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222 MAsTERSON V. SINE [68 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 7725. In Bank. Feb. 6, 1968.] 
REBECCA D. MASTERSON et al., Plaintiffs and Respond-
ents, v. LU E. SINE et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Vendor and· Purchaser-Option to Repurchase-Oonstruction: 
Extrinsic Evidence.-In construing the grantors' option to re-
purchase in a deed conveying their ranch, the court properly 
admitted extrinsic evidence to render the repurchase priee 
sufficiently certain to permit specific performance by showing 
that such price, described in the deed as " . •• the same con-
sideration as being paid heretofore plus. • • depreciation 
value of any improvements •• .I' was meant by the grantors 
and grantees to be $50,000 plus expenditures for improvements 
by the grantees less depreciation allowable under federal in-
come tax regulations at the time of exercising the option. 
[2] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Rule.-When the parties to a 
written contract have agreed to it as an "integration," namely, 
a complete and final embodiment of the terms of the agree-
ment, parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its 
terms. ' 
[3] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence: Exceptions to Rule-Where-Agree-
ment Is Incomplete.-When only part of a written contract is 
integrated, parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary the 
terms of that part, but parol evidence may be. used to prove 
elements of the agreement not reduced to writing. 
[4] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule-Test of Oom-
pleteness.-The crucial issue in determining whether there has 
been an integration is whether the parties intended their writ-
ing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement. 
[6] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule--Test of Oom-
pleteness: Prior or Oontemporaneous Agreements.-The cir-
cnunstances at the time of writing a contract may aid in deter-
mining whether the parties intended it to be integrated, and 
any collateral agreement must be examined to determine 
whether the parties intended the subjects of negotiation it 
dealt with to be included in, excluded from or otherwise af-
fected by the writing, even though the written contract may 
[5] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 266; Am.Jur.2d, Evidenee, 
§§ 1049, 1050. 
:HeX. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 40, 99; 
Evidenee, §§ 348, 398; [2] Evidence, § 327; [3] Evidence, §§ 327, 
364; [4] Evidence, § 366; [5] Evidence, §§ 366,376; [6] Evidence, 
§ 375; [7] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 40, 99; Evidence, §§ 348, 398; 
Assignments, § 22; (8,9] Assignments, § 22. 
) 
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have expressed the parties' intention to nullify antecedent 
understandings or agreements. 
[6] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule-Prior or Con-
temporaneous Agreements-When Inadmissible.-Evidence of 
oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the 
fact finder is likely to be misled. 
['1a, 7b] Vendor and Purchaser-Option to Repurchase-Construc-
tion: Extrinsic Evidence.-In a nonjury declaratory relief ac-
tion by a bankrupt's wife and trustee in bankruptcy to estab-
lish their right to enforce an option to repurchase a ranch that 
the bankrupt and his wife, as tenants in eommon, had con\'-
veyed to his sister and brother-in-law, it was reversible error 
to exclude extrinsic evidence offered to show that the parties 
. had agreed that the option was personal to the grantors so as 
to keep the property in the family, where the option clause ill 
the deed of conveyance, silent on the question of assignability, 
did not explicitly provide that it contained the complete agree-
ment, and where, in light of the grantors' inexperience in land 
transactions, the condition of .nonassignability might "natur-
ally" have been made the subject of a separate collateral agree-
ment. : 
[8] Assignment-Rights Assignable-Stipulations Against Assign-
ment.-In the absence of a controlling statute the parties may 
provide that a contract right or duty is nontransferable. 
[9] Id.-Rights Assignable-Stipulations Against Assignment-
Implied.-Even when there is no explicit agreement, written or 
oral, that contractual duties shall be personal, courts will ef-
fectuate a presumed intent to that effect if the circumstances 
indicate that performance by a substituted person would be 
different from that contracted for. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Glenn 
County. Richard E. Patton, Judge.· Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief to establish plaintiff's right 
to enforce an option to repurchase certain real property. 
Judgment declaring plaintiff's right to exercise the option 
reversed. 
Rawlins Coffman and Noel Watkins for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
[7] Admissibility of parol evidence with respect to reservations 
or exceptions upon conveyance of real property, note, 61 A.L.R.2d 
1390. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Assignments, § 17; Am.Jur.2d, Assign-
ments, § 22. 
• Aasiped by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
(i 
) 
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Glicksberg, Kushner & Goldberg, Lawrence Goldberg, Truce 
& Veal, Harlan Veal and Huard F. Geis for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-DaUas Masterson and his wife Rebecca 
owned a ranch as tenants in common. On February 25, 1958, 
they conveyed it io Medora and Lu Sine by a grant deed "Re-
serving unto the Grantors herein an option to purchase the 
above described property on or before February 25, 1968" for 
the "same consideration as being paid heretofore plus their 
depreciation value of any improvements Grantees may add to 
the property from and after two and a half years from this 
date." Medora is Dallas' sister and Lu's wife. Since the con-
veyance Dallas has been adjudged bankrupt. His trustee in 
bankruptcy and Rebecca brought this declaratory relief ac-
tion to establish their right to enforce the option. 
'I'he case was tried without a jury. Over defendants' objec-
tion the trial court admitted extrinsic evidence that by "the 
same consideration as being paid heretofore" both the grant-
ors and the grantees meant the sum of $50,000 and by "de-
preciation value of any improvements" they meant the de-
preciation value of improvements to be co~puted by deduct-
ing from the total amount of any capital expenditures made 
by defendaritsgrantees the amount of depreciation allowable 
to them under United States income tax regulations as of the 
time of the exercise of the option. 
The court also determined that the parol evidence rule .pre-
cluded admission of extrinsic evidence offered by defendants 
to show that the parties wanted the property kept in the Mas-
terson family and that the option was therefore personal to the 
grantors and could not be exercised by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. 
The court entered judgment for .plaintiffs, declaring their 
right to exercise the option, specifying in some detail how it 
could be exercised, and reserving jurisdiction to supervise the 
manner of its exercise and to determine the amount that plain-
tiffs will be required to pay defendants for their capital ex-
penditures if plaintiffs decide to exercise the option. 
[1] Defendants appeal. They contend that thc option pro-
vision is too uncertain to be enforced and that extrinsic evi-
dence as to its meaning should not have been admitted. The 
trial court properly refused to frustrate the obviously de-
clared intention of the grantors to reserve an option to repur-
chase by an overly meticulous insistence on completeness and 
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clarity of written expression. (See California Lettuce Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 474, 481 [289 
P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496] ; Rivers v. Beadle (1960) 183 Cal. 
App.2d 691,695-697 [7 Cal.Rptr. 170].) It properly admitted 
extrinsic evidence to explain the language of the deed (Nof-
ziger v. Holman (1964) 61 Cal.2d 526, 528 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 384, 
393 P.2d 696] ; Barham v. Barham (1949) 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-
423 [202 P.2d 289] ; Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co. (1948) 
31 Cal.2d 300, 306 [188 P.2d 470] ; Schmidt v. Maceo Constr. 
Co. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 717,730 [260 P.2d 230] ; see Farns-
worth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts (1967) 76 Yale 
L.J. 939, 959-965; Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and 
the Parol Evidence Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161) to the 
end that the consideration for the option would appear with 
sufficient certainty to permit specific enforcement (see Mc-
Keon v. Santa Claus of Cal., Inc. (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 359, 
364 [41 Cal.Rptr. 43] ; Vurrow v. Timmsen (1963) 223 Ca1. 
App.2d 283, 288 [35 Cal.Rptr. 668, 100 A.L.R.2d 544]). The 
trial court erred, however, in excluding the extrinsic evidence 
that the option was personal to the grantors and therefore non-
assignable. 
[2] When the parties to a written contract have agreed to 
it as an "integration"-a complete and final embodiment of 
the terms of an agreement-parol evidence cannot be used to 
add to or vary its terms. (Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney 
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 676, 679-680 [16 Cal.Rptr. 345, 365.P.2d 
401] ; Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Ca1.2d 458, 465 [241 P.2d 
4] ; see 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 573, p. 357; Rest., Con-
tracts (1932) §§ 228 (and com. a), 237 ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; 
Civ. Code, § 1625.) [3] When only part of the agreement 
is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, but parol evi-
dence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not re-
duced to writing. (Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods Co. (1964) 
61 Cal.2d 571, 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529, 394 P.2d 65] ; Schwartz 
v. Shapiro (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 250 [40 Cal.Rptr. 189] ; 
Mangini v. Wolfschmidt, Ltd. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 192, 
200-201 [331 P.2d 728] ; Rest., Contracts (1932) § 239.) 
[4] The crucial issue in determining whether there has 
been an integration is whether the parties intended their writ-
ing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement. 
[5] The instrument itself may help to resolve that issue. It 
may state, for example, that "there are no previous under-
standings or agreements not contained in the writing," and 
118 C.2d-8 
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thus express the parties' "intention to nullify antecedent un-
derstandings or agreements." (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) 
§ 578, p. 411.) Any such collateral agreement itself must be 
examined, however, to determine whether the parties intended 
the subjects of negotiation it deals with to be included in, ex-
cluded from, or. otherwise affected by the writing. Circum-
stances at the time of the writing may also aid in the deter-
mination of such integratIon. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) 
§ § 582-584; McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 216, p. 441; 9 
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2430, p. 98, § 2431, pp. 
102-103; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 721; Schwartz 
v. Shapiro, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 251, fn. 8; contra, 4 
Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 633, pp. 1014-1016.) 
California cases have. stated that whether there was an inte-
gration is to be determined solely from the face of the instru-
ment (e.g., Thoroman v. David (1926) 199 Cal. 386, 389-390 
[249 P. 513] ;' Heffner v. Gross (1919) 179 Cal. 738, 742-743 
[178 P. 860]; Gardiller v. McDonogh (1905) 147 Cal. 313, 318-
321 [81 P. 964] ; Harrison v. McOormick (1891) 89 Cal. 327, 
330 [26 P. 830,23 Am.St.Rep. 469]), and that the question for 
the court is whetller it "appears to be a complete ... agree-
ment. . . ." (See Ferguson v. ICoch (1928) 204 Cal. 342, 346 
[268 P. 342, 58 A.L.R. 1176] ; Harrison v. McOurmick, supra, 
89 Cal. 327, 330.) Neither of these strict formulations of the 
rule, however, has been consistently applied. The requirement 
that the writing must appear incomplete on its face has been 
repudiated in many cases where parol evidence was admitted 
"to prove the existence of a separatc oral agreement as to any 
matter on which the document is silent and which is not in-
consistent with its terms "--even though the iustrument ap-
peared to state a complete agreement. (E.g., Americall Indus-
trial Sales Oorp. v. A.irscope, Inc. (1955) 44 Ca1.211 393, 397 
[282 P.2d 504, 49 A.L.R.2d 1344]; Stockburger v. Dolan 
(1939) 14 Ca1.2d 313,317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.IJ.H. 8:1] ; Orall'-
ford v. France (1933) 219 Cal. 439, 443 [27 P.2rl M5] ; B1wl.·-
ner v. A.. Leon & 00. (1928) 204 Cal. 225, 227 f2(;7 P. 693] ; 
Sivers v. Si'L'ers (1893) 97 Cal. 518, 521 [32 P. 571] ; cf. Sim-
mons v. California Institute of Technology (1949) 34 Cal.2d 
264,274 [209 P.2d 581].) Even under the rule that the writing 
alone is to be c!ll1!!llltrd, it was found necessary to eXaJuin,> 
the alleged co11at('ral fI~reenH'llt bC'fore concluding that proof 
of it was precluded by the writiult nlonl'. (See 3 Corbiu, Cllll-
tracts (1960) § 582, pp. 444-446.) 1t is tl1er('fore evid('ut thnt 
"The conct'ption of a \Vritin~.(" IlS WllOlIy and illlrinsiclllI~' ~",If­
determinative of the parties' intent to maIm it a sole memorial 
) 
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of one or seven or twenty-seven subjects of negotiation is an 
impossible one." (9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2431, 
p. 103.) For example, a promissory note given by a debtor to 
his creditor may integrate all their present contractual rights 
and obligations, or it may be only a minor part of an underly-
ing executory contract that would never be discovered by 
examining the face of the note. 
In formulating the rule governing parol evidence, several 
policies must be accommodated. One policy is based on the 
assumption that written evidence is more accurate than hu-
man memory. (Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co. (1908) 
153 Cal. 585, 595 [96 P. 319].) This policy, however, can be 
adequately ~rved by excluding parol evidence of agreements 
that directly contradict the writing. Another policy is based 
on the fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses 
interested in the outcome of the litigation will mislead the 
finder of facts. (Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co., 
supra, 153 Cal. 585, 596; Mitchill v. Lath (1928) 247 N.Y. 
377,388 [160 N.E. 646, 68 A.L.R. 239] [dissenting opinion by 
Lehman, J.] ; see 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2431, 
p. 102; Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification 
(1966) 4 Duquesne L.Rev. 337, 338-339.) McCormick has sug-
gested that the party urging the spoken as against the writ-
ten word is most often the economic underdog, threatened by 
severe hardship if the writing is enforced. In his view the 
parol evidence rule arose to allow the court to control the ten-
dency of the jury to find through sympathy and without a dis-
passionate assessment of the probability of fraud or faulty 
memory that the parties made an oral agreement collateral 
to the written contract, or that preliminary tentative agree-
ments were not abandoned when omitted from the writing. 
(See McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 210.) He recognizes, 
however, that if this theory were adopted in disregard of all 
other considerations, it would lead to the exclusion of testi-
mony concerning oral agreements whenever there is a writing 
and thereby often defeat the true intent of the parties. (See 
McCormick, op. cit. supra, § 216, p. 441.) 
[6] Evidence of oral collateral agreements should be ex-
cluded only when the fact finder is likely to be misled. The 
rule must therefore be based on the credibility of the evidence. 
One such standard, adopted by section 240(1) (b) of the Re-
statement of Contracts, permits proof of a collateral agree-
ment if it "is such an agreement as might naturally be made 
as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties 
228 MASTERSON tI. SINE [68 C.2d 
to the written contract." (Italics added; see McCormick, 
Evidence (1954) § 216, p. 441; see also 3 Corbin, Contracts 
(1960) § 583, p. 475, § 594, pp. 568-569; 4 Williston, Contracts 
(3d ed. 1961) § 638, pp. 1039-1045.) The draftsmen of the 
Uniform Commercial Code would exclude the evidence in 
still fewer instan!!es: "If the additional terms are such that, 
if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in 
the document in the view of the court, then evidence of their 
alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.'.' (Com. 3, 
§ 2-202, italics added.)1 
[7a] The option clause in the deed in the present case 
does not explicitly provide that it contains the complete agree-
ment, and the deed is silent on the question of assignability. 
Moreover, the difficulty of accommodating the formalized 
structure of a deed to the insertion of collateral agreements 
makes it less likely that all the terms of such an agreement 
were included.:! (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 587; 4 
Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 645; 70 A.L.R. 752; 759 
(1931); 68 A.L.R. 245 (1930).) The statement of the reserva-
tion of the option might well have been placed in the recorded 
deed solely to preserve the grantors' rights against any pos- _. -- . 
sible future purchasers, and this function could well be served 
without any-mention of the parties' agreement that the option 
was personal. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the parties to this family transaction, through experience in 
land transactions or otherwise, had any warning of the disad-
vantages of failing to put the whole agreement in the deed. 
This case is one, therefore, in which it can be said that a col-
lateral agreement such as that alleged "might naturally be 
made as a separate agreement." A fortiori, the case is not one 
lCorbin suggests that, even in situations where the court concludes that 
it would not have been natural for the parties to make the alleged 
collateral oral agreement, parol evidence of sueh an agreement should 
nevertheless be permitted if the court is convinced that the unnatural 
actually happened in the case being adjudicatcd. (3 Corbin, Contracts, 
§ 485, pp. 478, 480; cf. Murray, The !'arol Evidence Rule: A Olarification 
(1966) 4 Duquesne L. Rev. 337, 341-342.) This suggestion may be based 
on a belief that judges are not likely to be misled by their sympathies. 
If the COUI·t believes that the parties intended a collateral agreement to 
be effective, there is no reaRon to keep the evidence from the jury. 
2See G~ble v. Dotson (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d272 [21 CaI.Rptr. 769), 
where the deed given by a real estate developer to the plaintiffs contained 
a condition that grantees would not build a pier or boathouse. Despite 
this reference in the deed to the subject of berthing for boats, the court 
allowed plaintiffs to prove by parol evidence that the condition was 
agreed to in return for the developer's oral promise that plaintiffs were 
to have the use of two boat spaces nearby. 
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in which the parties "would certainly" have included the 
collateral agreement in the deed. 
It is contended, however, that an option agreement is ordi-
narily presumed to be assignable if it contains no provisions 
forbidding its transfer or indicating that its performance in-
volves elements personal to the parties. (Mott v. Cline (1927) 
200 Cal. 434, 450 [253 P. 718]; Altman v. Blewett (1928) 93 
Cal . .A.pp. 516, 525 [269 P. 751].) The fact that there is a writ-
ten memorandum, however, does not necessarily pr~clude 
parol evidence rebutting a term that the law would otherwise 
presume. In American Industrial Sales Corp. v. Airscope, 
Inc., supra, 44 Ca1.2d 393, 397-398, we held it proper to ad-
mit parol evidence of a contemporaneous collateral agreement 
as to the place of payment of a note, even though it contra-
dicted the presumption that a note, silent as to the place of 
payment, is payable where the creditor resides. (For other ex-
amples of this approach, see Richter v. Union Land etc. Co. 
(1900) 129 Cal. 367, 375 [62 P. 39] [presumption of time of 
delivery rebutted by parol evidence] ; Wolters v. King (1897) 
119 Cal. 172, 175-176 [51 P. 35] [presumption of time of pay-
ment rebutted by parol evidence]; Mangini v. Wolfschmidt, 
Ltd., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 192, 198-201 [presumption of 
duration of an agency contract rebutted by parol evidence] ; 
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1957) 148 Cal..A.pp.2d 56, 73-74 [306 
P.2d 1017]; see also Rest., Contracts, § 240, com. C.)3 Of 
course a statute may preclude parol evidence to rebut a statu-
tory presumption. (E. G. Neff v. Ernst (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 628, 
635 [311 P.2d 489] [commenting on Civ. Code, § 1112] ; Kil-
foy v. Fritz (1954) 125 Cal..A.pp.2d 291, 293-294 [270 P.2d 
800unsel for plaintiffs direct our attention to numerous eases that they 
contend establish that parol evidence may never be used to show a col-
lateral agreement contrary to a term that the law presumes in the 
absence of an agreement. In each of these eases, however, the decision 
turned upon the court's belief that the writing was a complete integra-
tion and was no more than an application of the rule that parol evidence 
cannot be used to vary the terms of a completely integrated agreement. 
(Of. discussion in Mangini v. Wolfscllmidt, Ltd., 8upra, 165 Cal.App.2d 
192, 203.) In Gardiner v. McDonogh, supra, 147 Cal. 313, 319, defend-
ants sought to prove a collateral agreement that beans sold them were 
to conform to a sample earlier given. The court purportedly looked only 
to the face of the writing to decide whether parol evidence was admissi· 
ble, and such evidence would be excluded if the writing was "clear and 
complete." Defendants argued that the written order was not complete 
because it did not fix a time and place of delivery, but the court answered 
that the failure to state those t.erms did not result in incompleteness 
because the law would supply them by implication. This decision was 
based on the belief that the question of admissibility had to be decided 
from the face of the instrument alone. Virtually every writing leaves 
) 
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579] [applying Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act. 652, § 15(a)] ; 
see also Com. Code, § 9-318, subd. (4).) Here, however, there 
is no such statutc. [8] In the absence of a controlling stat-
ute the parties may provide that a contract right or duty is 
nontransferable. (La Rue v. Groezinger (1890) 84 Cal. 281, 
283 [24 P. 42, 18 Am.St.Rep. 179]; Benton v. Hofmann Plas-
tering Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 61, 68 [24 Cal.Rptr. 268] ; 
Parkinson v. Caldwell (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 548, 552-553 
[272 P.2d 934] ; see 4 Corbin, Contracts (1951) §§ 872:873~) 
[9] Moreover, even when t.here is no explicit agreement-
written or oral-that contractual duties shall be personal, 
courts will effectuate a presumed intent to that effect if the 
circumstances indicate that performance by a substituted 
person would be different from that contracted for. (Farm-
land Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 208, 222 [308 
P.2d 732, 66 A.L.R.2d 590] ; Prichard v. Kimball (1923) 190 
Cal. 757, 764-765 [214 P. 863] ; Simmons v. Zimmerman (1904) 
144 Cal. 256, 260-261 [79 P. 451, 1 Ann.Cas. 850] ; La Rue v. 
Groezinger, supra, 84 Cal. 281, 285; Coykendall v. Jackson 
some terms to be implied and almost none would qualify as integrations 
without implying some terms. The deciHion was therefore a product of 
an outmoded approach to the parol evidence rule, Dot of any compUlsion 
to give conclusive. effect to ]lresuUll'tions of imlllied terms. 
In Standard BOlli CO. v. Mutual Biscuit Co. (1909) 10 Cal.App. 746, 
750 [103 P. 938], the rationale of Gardiner v. McDonogh was extended 
to exclude evidence of an agreement for a time of performance other 
than tlte .. reasonable time" implied by law in a situation where the 
writing, although stating no time of performanee, was •• clear and com-
plete when aided by that which is imported into it by legal implication." 
'I'his decision was simply an application of the then-current theory regard-
ing integration. The court regarded the instrument as a complete integra-
tion, and it therefore precluded proof of collateral agreements. Since it 
is now clear that integration cannot be determined from the writing 
alone, the decision is not authoritative insofar as it finds a complete 
integration. There is no reason to believe that the eourtgave any inde-
pendent significance to implied terms. Had the court found from the 
writing alone that there was no integration, there is nothing to indicate 
that it would have excluded proof contrary to terms it would have other-
wise presumed. 
In Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co. (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 700, 710 
[4 Cal.Bptr. 103], the court refused to admit parol evidence showing a 
collateral oral agreement that a buyer would have more than the •• reason-
able time" presumed by law to refuse goods, but the decision is based 
on a conclusion that the writing on its face was a complete expression 
of the agreement. In La Francc v. Kashis1lian (1928) 204 Cal. 643, 645 
[269 P. 655], and Fogler v. Pur7&iser (1932) 127 Cal.App. 554, 559-560 
[16 P.2d 305], there are no clear findings concerning the completeness 
of the writings: but the argument in each case is borrowed from the 
Standard BOlli Co. decision and thus implies a finding of a complete 
integration. Calpetro Producers Syndicate v. C. M. Woods Co. (1929) 
206 Cal. 246, 247-248, 252 [274 P. 65], relies on Standard BOlli Co. and 
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(1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 729, 731 [62 P.2d 746]; see 4 Corbin, 
Contracts (1951) § 865; 3 Williston, Contracts (3d cd. 1960) 
§ 412, pp. 32-33; Rest., Contracts (Tent. Draft No.3, 1967) 
§ 150(2).) 
[7b] In the present case defendants offered evidence that 
the parties agreed that the option was not assignable in order 
to keep the property in the Masterson family. The trial court 
erred in excluding that evidence. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., 
concurred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion: 
(1) Undermines the parol evidence rule as we have known 
it in this state since at least 18721 by declaring that parol evi-
dence should have been admitted by the trial court to SllOW 
that a written option, absolute and unrestricted in form, WLlS 
intended to be limited and nonassignable; 
(2) Renders suspect instruments of conveyance absolutc 
on their face; 
(3) Materially lessens the reliance which may be placed 
upon written instruments affecting the title to real estatc; and 
(4) Opens the door, albeit unintentionally, to a new tecl1-
nique for the defrauding of creditors. 
The opinion permits defendants to establish by parol testi-
mony that their grant2 to their brother (and brother-in-law) 
of a written option, absolute in terms, was nevertheless agreed 
to be nonassignable by the grantee (now a bankrupt), and that 
therefore the right to exercise it did not pass, by operation of 
the bankruptcy laws, to the trustee for the benefit of the 
grantee's creditors. 
And how was this to be shown T By the proffered testimony 
of the bankrupt optionee himself! Thereby one of his assets 
(the option to purchase defendants' California ranch) would 
be withheld from the trustee in bankruptcy and from the 
bankrupt's creditors. Understandably the trial court, as re-
quired by the parol evidence rule, did not allow the bankrupt 
by parol to so contradict the unqualified language of the writ-
ten option. 
lIn that year the Legislature set forth the rule in sections 1625 of the 
Civil Code and 1856 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
!!Th~ option wnR ill thl' form of a res('r\'ation in a dped; however, in 
legal c11' .. c-l it is the same :IS if it haJ hcell cOlltaiu('(\ ill a sCI':lratc <1ocu-
lUcut. 
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The court properly admitted parol evidence to explain the 
intended meaning of the "same consideration" and "depre-
ciation value" phases of the written option to purchase de-
fendants' land, as the intended meaning of those phrases was 
not clear. However, there was nothing ambiguous about the 
granting language. of the option and not the slightest sugges-
tion in the document that the option was to be nonassignable. 
Thus, to permit such words of limitation to be added by parol 
is to contradict the absolute nature of the grant, and to 
directly violate the parol evidence rule. 
Just as it is unnecessary to state in a deed to "lot X" that 
the house located thereon goes with the land, it is likewise un-
necessary to add to "I grant an option to Jones" the words 
"and his assigns" for the option to be assignable. As herein-
after emphasized in more detail, California statutes expressly 
declare that it is assignable, and only if I add language in 
writing showing my intent to withhold or restrict the right of 
assignment may the grant be so limited. Thus, to seek to re-
i strict the grant by parol is to contradict the written docu-
ment in violation of the parol evidence rule. 
The majority opinion arrives at its holding via a series of 
false premises which are not supported either in the record of 
this case or i~ such California authorities as are offered. 
The parol evidence rule is set forth in clear and definite 
language in the statutes of this state. (Civ. Code, § 1625; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1856.) It "is not a rule of evidence but is one of 
substantive law. . .. The rule as applied to contracts is sim-
ply that as a matter of substantive law, a certain act, the act 
of embodying the complete terms of an agreement in a writing 
(the 'integration'), becomes the contract of the parties." 
(Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 465 [1, 2] [241 P.2d 
4], quoting from Estate of Gaines (1940) 15 Cal.2d 255, 264-
265 [100 P.2d 1055].) The rule is based upon the sound prin-
ciple that the parties to a written instrument, after commit-
ting their agreement to or evidencing it by the writing, are not 
permitted to add to, vary or contradict the terms of the writ-
ing by parol evidence. As aptly expressed by the author of the 
present majority opinion, speaking for the court in Parsons 
v. Bristol De1l. Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861,865 [2] [44 Cal.Rptr. 
767, 402 P.2d 839], and in Coast Bank v. Minderhout (1964) 
61 Cal.2d 311,315 [38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265], such evi-
dence is "admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to 
give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible." 
(Italics added.) Or, as stated by the same author, concurring 
/) 
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in Laux v. Freed (1960) 53 Ca1.2d 512, 527 [2 Cal.Rptr. 265, 
348 P.2d 873], "extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 'add to, 
detract from, or vary its terms.' " (Italics added.) 
At the outset the majority in the present case reiterate3 that 
the rule against contradicting or varying the terms of a writ-
ing remains applicable when only part of the agreement is 
contained in the writing, and parol evidence is used to prove 
elements of the agreement not reduced to writing. But having 
restated this established rule, the majority opinion inexplic-
ably proceeds to subvert it. 
Each of the three cases cited by the majority (fn. 3, ante) 
holds that although parol evidence is admissible to prove the 
parts of the contract not put in writing, it is not admissible 
to vary or contradict the writing or prove collateral agree-
ments which are inconsistent therewith. The meaning of this 
rule (and the application of it found in the cases) is that if 
the asserted unwritten elements of the agreement would con-
tradict, add to, detract from, vary or be inconsistent with the 
written agree~ent, then such elements may not be shown by 
parol evidence. 
The contract of sale and purchase of the ranch property 
here inv.olved was carried out through a title company upon 
written escrow instructions executed by the respective parties 
after various preliminary negotiations. The deed to defendant 
. grantees, in which the grantors expressly reserved an option to 
repurchase the property within a ten-year period and upon a 
specified consideration, was issued and delivered in consum-
mation of the contract. In neither the written escrow instruc-
tions nor the deed containing the option is there any language 
even suggesting that the option was agreed or intended by the 
parties to be personal to the grantors, and so nonassignable. 
The trial judge, on at least three separate occasions, correctly 
sustained objections to efforts of defendant optionors to get 
into evidence the testimony of Dallas Masterson (the bankrupt 
holder of the option) that a part of the agreement of sale of the 
parties was that the option to repurchase the property was 
personal to him, and therefore unassignable for benefit of 
creditors. But the majority hold that that testimony should 
have been admitted, thereby permitting defendant optionors 
8Citing three California eases (ante, p. 225) ; Hulse v. Juillard Fancy 
Food8 Co. (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 571, 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529, 394 P.2d 65]; 
SchwartB v. Shapiro (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 250 [40 Cal.Rptr. 189]; 
Mangini v. Wolf8chmidt, Ltd. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 192, 200-201 [331 
P.2d 728]. 
) 
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to limit, detract from and contradict the plain and unre-
stricll'd t,.'rIllS of the written option in clear viulation of tile 
parol cvidl'nce rule and to open the door to the perpetration of 
fraud. 
Options are property, and are widely used in the sale and 
purchase of real and personal property. One of the basic inci-
dents of property ownership is the right of the owner to sell 
or transfer it. The author of the present majority opinion, 
speaking for the court in Fannland Irr. CO. Y. Dopplmaier 
(1957) 48 Ca1.2d 208, 222 [308 P.2d 732, 66 A.L.R2d 590], put 
it this way: "The statutes in this state clearly manifest a pol-
icy in favor of the free transferability of all types of property, 
including rights under contracts."4 (Citing Civ. Code, 
§§ 954, 1044, 1458n ; see also 40 Cal.Jur.2d 289-291, and cases 
there cited.) These rights of the owner of property to transfer 
it. C(;nfirlfled, by the cited code sections, are elementary rules 
of substantive law and not the mere disputable presumptions 
which the majority opinion ill :the present case would make of 
them, Moreoyer, the right of tt-ansferability applies to an op-
tion to purchase, unless there are words of limitation in the 
option forbillJing its assig-ulllrnt or showing that it was given 
because of a peculiar trust or confidence reposed in the op-
tiol1('e. (Mott v. Cline (1927) 200 Cal. 434, 450 [11] [253 P. 
718] ; Prichard v. I{imba.ll (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764-765 [4,5] 
[214 P. 863] ; Altman v. Blewett (1928) 93 Cal.App. 516, 525 
pq [269 P. 751] ; see also 5 Cal.Jur.2d 393, 395.396, and cases 
there cited.) Thus, in Prichard t.he language of the document 
'itself (a written, expressly nonassignable lease, with option to 
buy) was held to establish the trust or confidence reposed in 
the optionee and so to negate assignability of the option. 
'l'he right of an optionee to transfer his option to purchase 
property is accordingly one of the basic rights which accom-
panies the option unless limited under the language of the op-
tion itself. '1'0 allow an optionor to resort to parol evidence to 
snpport his assertion that the written option is not transferable 
4Thc opinion contillues: "The terms and purpose of a contract may 
show, however, thot it was intended to be nonassignable." With this 
'lu:t1ifie:tlion of the gencral rulc I am in accord, but here it is inapplicable 
as languagc indicoting any intention whatever to restrict assignability 
is eompletely nonexi~tcnt. 
flRcetion 1 OH: "Property of any kind may be trollsferrcd, except as 
otherwise provided by this articlc." The only property the article pro· 
vides cannot be transfcrred is "A mere possibility, not con pled with an 
interest." (§ 1045.) 
Section 1458: "A l'ight arising out of an obligation is the property of 
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is to authorize him to limit the option by attempting to restrict 
and reclaim rights with which hc has already parted. A 
clearer violation of two substantive and basic rules of law-
the parol evidence rule and the right of free transferability of 
property-would be difficult to conceive. 
The majority opinion attempts to buttress its approach by 
asserting (ante, p. 226) that "California cases have stated 
that whether there was an integration is to be determined sole-
ly from the face of the instrument [citations), and that the 
question for the court is whether it 'appears t{) be a complete 
... agreement .... [citations],~' but that "Neither of these 
strict formulations of the rule ... has been consistently ap-
plied. " 
The majority's claim of inconsistent application of the 
parol evidence rule by the California courts fails to find sup-
port in the examples offered. First, the majority opinion 
asserts (ante, p. 226) that "The requirement that the writ-
ing must appear incomplete on its face has been repudi-
ated ill many cases where parol evidence was admitted 'to 
prove the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any mat-
ter on which the document is silent and which is not incon-
sistent with its terms '-even though the instrument appeared 
to state a complete agreement. [Citations.]" But an examina-
tion of the cases cited in support of the quoted statement dis-
closes that on the contrary in every case which is pertinent 
here (with a single exception) the writing was obviously in-
complete on its face. s In the one exception (Stockburger v. 
Dolan (1939) 14 Ca1.2d 313, 317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.L.R. 83]) 
it was held that lessors under a lease to drill for oil in an area 
zoned against such drilling should be permitted to show by 
parol that the lessee had contemporaneously agreed orally to 
seek a variance-an agreement which, as the opinion points 
out, did not contradict the written contract. But what is addi-
tionally noteworthy in Stockburger, and controlling here, is 
6Thus in American Industrial Sales Corp. v. Airscope, Inc. (1955) 44 
Ca1.2d 393, 397 [282 P.2d 504,49 A.L.R.2d 1344), the contract was silent 
as t.o the place of paymrnt for property purchased; in Crawford v. 
France (1933) 219 Cal. 439, 443 [27 P.2d 645), a contract for an archi· 
tect's fee basecl upon the eost of a building was s'ilent as to such cost; 
in Buckner v. A. Leon 4' Co. (1928) 204 Cal. 225, 227 [267 P. 693], a 
contract for sale and purchase of grapes was silent as to which party 
was to furnish the lug boxes required for delivery; ill Sivers v. Sivers 
(1893) 97 Cal. 518, 521 [32 P. 571], a written agreement to repay money 
loaned was silent as to the time for payment; and Simmons v. California 
Institute of Technology (1949) 34 Cal.2d 264, 274 [9) [209 P.2d 581], 
was a case of fra'ud in the inducement and not one of parol evidence to 
show a promise or agreement inconsistent with the written contract. 
236 MASTERSON V. SINE [68 C.2d 
the further holding that lessors could not show by parol that 
lessee had orally agreed that a lease provision suspending pay-
ment of rental under certain circumstances would not apply 
during certain periods of time-as "evidence to that effect 
would vary the terms of the contract in that particular .... " 
(P. 317 [5] of 14 CaI.2d.) 
In further pursuit of what would appear to be nonexistent 
support for its assertions of inconsistency in California cases, 
the majority opinion next declares (ante, p. 226) that "Even 
under the rule that the writing alone is to be consulted, it was 
found necessary to examine the alleged collateral agreement 
before concluding that proof of it was precluded by the writing 
alone. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 582, pp. 444-446.) " 
Not only are no California cases cite(Z by the majority in sup-
posed support for the quoted declaration (offered by the ma-
jority as an example of inconsistent applications of the parol 
evidence rule 'by California courts), but 3 Corbin, Contracts, 
which the majority do cite, likewise refers to no California 
cases, and makes but scanty citation to any cases whatever. 
In any event, in what manner other than by "examining" an 
alleged collateral agreement is it possible for a court to rule 
upon the admissibility of testimony or upon an offer of proof 
with respect to such agreement' 
The majority opinion has thus demonstrably failed to sub-
stantiate its next utterance (ante, pp. 226-227) that" 'The con-
ception of a writing as wholly and intrinsically self-determi-
native of the parties' intent to make it a sole memorial of one 
or seven or twenty-seven snbjects of negotiation is an impos-
sible one,' " citing 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) section 
2431, page 103, whose views on the subject were rejected by 
this court as early as 1908 in Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Arms-
by Co., 153 Cal. 585, 595 [96 P. 319], which, indeed, is also 
citcd by the majority in the present case. And the example 
given, that of a promissory note, is obviously specious. Rarely, 
if ever, does a promissory note given by a debtor to his creditor 
integrate all their agreements (that is not the purpose it 
serves) ; it mayor it may not integrate all their present con-
tractual rights and obligations; but relevant to the parol evi-
dence rule, at least until the advent of the majority opinion in 
this case, alleged collateral agreements which would vary or 
cuntradict the terms and conditions of a promissory note may 
not be shown by parol. (Bank of Amcrica etc. Assn. v. Pen-
dergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258, 263-264 [6] [48 P.2d 659].) 
Upon this structure of incorrect premises a~d ~nfQQnded 
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assertions the majority opinion arrives at its climax: The pro-
nouncement of ,. several policies [to] be accommodated . . . 
[i]n formulating the rule governing parol evidence." (Italics 
added.) 7 Two of the "policies" as declared by the majority 
are: Written evidence is more accurate than human mem-
ory8 j fraud or unintentional invention by interested witnesses 
may well occur. 
I submit that these purported" policies" are in reality two 
of the basic and obvious reasons for adoption by the Legislature 
of the parol evidence rule as the policy in this state. Thus the 
speculation of the majority (ante, pp. 227-228) concerning 
the views of various writers on the subject and the advisability 
of following them in this state is not only superfluous but flies 
flatly in the face of established California law and policy. It 
serves only to introduce uncertainty and confusion in a field 
of substantive law which was codified and made certain in this 
state a century ago. 
However, despite the law which until the advent of the pres-
ent majority opinion has been firmly and clearly established 
in California and relied upon by attorneys and courts alike, 
that parol evidence may not be employed to vary or contradict 
the terms of a written instrument, the majority now announce 
(ante, p. 227) that such evidence "should be excluded only 
when the fact finder is likely to be misled, " and that" The rule 
must therefore be based on the credibility of the evidence." 
(Italics added.) But was it not, inter alia, to avoid misleading 
the fact finder, and to further the introduction of only the evi-
dence which is most likely to be credible (the written docu-
ment), that the Legislature adopted the parol evidence rule as 
a part of the substantive law of this state Y 
Next, in an effort to implement this newly promulgated 
"credibility" test, the majority opinion offers a choice of two 
"standards": one, a "certainty" standard, quoted from the 
Uniform Commercial CodeD (ante, p. 228), and the other a 
7Jt is the Legislature of this state which did the formulating of the 
rule governing parol evidence nearly a century ago when in 1872, as 
previously noted, sections 1625 of the Civil Code and 1856 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure were adopted. And as already shown herein, the rule 
has since been consistently applied by the cOllrts of this state. The parol 
evidence rule as thus luid do\Vll by the Legislature and applied by the 
courts is the policy of this state. 
8Although the majOl'ity declare that tbis first "policy" may be served 
by excluding parol evidenee of agreements that directly contradict the 
writing, such contradiction is precisely the effect of the agreement sought 
to be shown by parol in this case. 
9" If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would 
certainly have been included in the document in the view of the court, 
) 
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"natural" standard found in the Restatement of Contracts10 
(ante, p. 227), and concludes (ante, p. 228) that at least for 
purposes of the present case the" natural" viewpoint should 
prevail. 
This new rule, not hitherto recognized in California, pro-
vides that proof of a claimed collateral oral agreement 'is ad-
missible if it is such an agreement as might naturally have 
been made a separate agreement by the parties under the par-
ticular circumstances. I submit that this approach opens the 
door to uncertainty and confusion. Who can know what its 
limits are Y Certainly I do not. For example, in its application 
to this case who could be expected to divine as "natural" a 
separate oral agreement between the parties that the assign-
ment, absolute and unrestricted on its face, was intended by 
the parties to be limited to the Masterson family? 
Or, assume that one gives to his relative a promissory note 
and that the payee of the note goes bankrupt. By operation of 
law the note becomes an asset of the bankruptcy. The trustee 
attempts to enforce it. Would the relatives be permitted to 
testify that by a separate oral agreement made at the time of 
the execution of the note it was understood that should the 
payee fail in his business the maker would be excused from 
payment o~ the note, or tIlat, as here, it was intended that the 
benefits of the note would be personal to the payee? I doubt 
that trial judges should be burdened with the task of conjur-
ing whether it would have been "natural" under those cir-
eUlllstances for such a separate agreement to have been made 
by the parties. Yet, under the application of the proposed rule, 
this is the task the trial judge would have, and in essence the 
situation presented in the instant case is no different. 
Under the application of the codes and the present case law, 
proof of the existence of such an agreement would not be per-
mitted, "natural" or "unnatural." But conceivably, as loose 
as the new rule is, one judge might deem it natural and another 
judge unnatural,u And in (,Hch instance the ultimate decision 
then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of 
fact." (Comment 3, § 2-202; italics added.) 
lOViz., proof of a collateral agrcement should be pClmitted if it "is 
such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate :lgreement 
by partics situateu rlS were the part-irs to the written c'l11tr:l(·t." (Restate-
ment of Contracts, § 240, subel. (1) (h) ; italics added.) 
110r pel'llUps application of the new l'Ule will turn upon the opinion of 
the court (trial or appellate) tl,at it is "natural" for one family group 
to agree that in case of unfriendly approach by :l creditor of any of 
them, then the debtor's propcl·ty will be transfera1le or assignable only 
to other members of the fmnily, whereas such a scheme might be con-
sidered less than" natural" for other families to pursue_ 
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would have to be matle ("naturally") on a casc-by-case basis 
by the appellate courts. 
In an cffort to provide justification for applying the newly 
pronounced" natural" rule to the circumstances of thc pres-
ent case, the majority opinion next (ante, p. 228) attempts 
to account for the silence of the writing in this case concern-
ing assignability of thc OptiOIl, by asserting that "thc diffi-
culty of accommodating the formalized structure of a deed to 
the insertion of collateral agreements makes it less likely that 
all the terms of such an agreement were included." What dif-
ficulty would have been involved here, to add the words "this 
option is nonassignable'" The asserted" formalized structure 
of a deed" is no formidable barrier. The Legislature has set 
forth the requirements in simple language in section 1092 of 
the Civil Code. It is this: "I, A B, grant to C D all that real 
property situated in [naming county], State of California., ... 
deseribed as follows: [describing it]." To this the grantor de-
siring to reserve an option to repurchase need only so state, as 
was done here. It is a matter of common knowledge that col-
lateral agreements (such as the option clause here involved, or 
such as deed restrictions) are frequently included in deeds, 
without difficulty of any nature. 
To support further speculation (ante, p. 228) that "the res-
ervation of the option might well have been placed in the re-
corded deed solely to preserve the grantors' rights against any 
possible future purchasers, and this function could well be 
served without any mention of the parties' agreement that the 
option was personal," the majority assert that "There is '/'lOth-
inU in the record to indicate that the parties to this family 
transaction, through experience in land transactions or other-
,Vise, had any warning of the disadvantages of failing to put 
the whole agreement in the deed." (Italics added.) The facts 
of this case, however, do not support such claim of naivetr. 
The grantor Imsband (the bankrupt businessman) testifiecl 
that as none of the parties were attorneys "we wanted to 1"011-
tact my attorney ... which we did .... The wording in the 
option was obtained from [the attorney] .... I told him what 
my discussion was with the Sines [defendant grantees] and he 
wanted ... a little time to compo!'e it .... And, then this 
[the wording provided by the attorney] was taken to the title 
company at the time 1\-1r. and Mrs. Sine and I went in to com-
plete tll e transaction." (Italics added.) The witness was an 
experienced businessman who thus demonstrated ;H\'Ill"rnpss of 
the wisdom of seeking legal guidance and advice in this busi-
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ness transaction, and who did so. Wherein lies the naive family 
transaction postulated by the majority' 
The majority opinion (ante, p. 229) then proceeds on the 
fallacious assertion that the right to transfer or to assign an 
option, if it contains no provisions forbidding transfer or indi-
cating that performance involves elements personal to the par-
ties, is a mere disputable presumption, and in purported sup-
port cites cases not one of which involves an option and in 
each of which the presumption which was invoked served to 
supply a missing but essential element of a complete agree-
ment.12 .As already emphasized hereinabove, the right of free 
transferability of property, including options, is one of the 
most fundamental tenets of substantive law, and the crucial 
distinction would appear self-evident between such a basic 
right on the one hand, and on the other hand the disputable 
evidentiary presumptions which the law has developed to sup-
ply terms lacking from a written instrument but essential to 
making it whore and complete. There is no such lack in the 
deed and the option reservation now at issue. . 
The statement of the majority opinion (ante, p. 230) that 
in the absence of a controlling statute the parties may provide 
that a contract right or duty is nontransferable, is of course 
true. Equally true is the next assertion (ante, p. 230) that 
"even when there is no explicit agreement-written or oral-
that contractual duties shall be personal, courts will effectuate 
a presumed intent to that effect if the circumstances indicate 
that performance by a substituted person would be different 
from that contracted for." But to apply the law of contracts 
for the rendering of personal services to the reservation of an 
option in a deed of real estate calls for a misdirected use of the 
rule, particularly in an instrument containing not one word 
from which such "a presumed intent to that effect" could be 
gleaned. Particularly is the holding objectionable when the re-
sult is to upset established statutory and case law in this state 
that" circumstances" shown by parol may not be employed to 
contradict, add to or detract from, the agreement of the par-
ties as expressed by them in writing. .And once again the 
quoted pronouncement of the majority concerning the show-
12Thus in A.merican Industrial Bales Corp. v. AirscoplJ, Inc., "'pra 
(1955) 44 Ca1.2d 393, 397, the missing element was the place of pay-
ment of a note; in Bicllter v. Union Land etc. Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 367, 
375 [62 P. 39], tI,e miRsing clement WIlS the time of delivery; in Wolters 
v. King (1897) 119 Cal. 172, 175-176 r51 P. 35]. it was the time of 
payment; and in Mangini v. Wolfsclimidt, Ltd., supra (1958) 165 Cal. 
App.2d 192, 200, and Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 56, 
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cases they cite,13 which relate to a patent license agreement, 
held to be assignable absent terms indicating a contrary in-
tent; a contract to sell grapes also held assignable; a contract 
which included language showing the intent that it be non-
assignable; a contract to buy land held to be assignable be-
cause approval of title by the buyer was held not to be a per-
sonal privilege attaching only to the assignor; and to con-
tracts for personal services. 
Neither personal skill nor personal qualities can be conjured 
as a requirement for the exercise of the option reserved in the 
deed here, regardless of how ardent may be the desire of the 
parties (the bankrupt husband-optionee and his sister), "to 
keep the property in the ... family." Particularly is this 
true when a contrary holding would permit the property to be 
acquired by plaintiff referee in bankruptcy for the benefit of 
the creditors of the bankrupt husband. 
Comment hardly seems necessary on the convenience to a 
bankrupt of such a device to defeat his creditors. He need 
only produce parol testimony that any options (or other prop-
erty, for that matter) which he holds are subject to an oral 
"collateral agreement" with family members (or with 
friends) that the property is nontransferable "in order to 
keep the property in the family" or in the friendly group. In 
the present case the value of the ranch which the bankrupt 
and his wife held an option to purchase has doubtless in-
creased substantially during the years since they acquired the 
option. The initiation of this litigation by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy to establish his right to enforce the option indicates his 
IBIn Farmland ITr. Co. v. Doppl1llaier, supra (J957) 48 CaI.2d 208,222, 
the court in bolding that a patent license agreement was assignable pur· 
suant to the policy" clearly manifested" by "tbe statutes in this state 
••• in favor of the free transferability of all types of property, includ· 
ing rights under contracts," stated" The terms and purpose of a con-
tract may show bowever, that it was intended to be nonassignable. Thus 
tbe duties i11lposed upon one party may be of such a personal nature that 
their performanee by someone else would in effeet deprive the other party 
of tbat for which he bargained. '1'he duties in sucb a situation cannot 
be delegated." (Citing La Rile v. Groezinger (1890) 84 Cal. 281, 283-
285, which held (p. 286 [24 P. 42. 18 Am.St.Rep. 179]) that a eon tract 
to sell grapes from a certain "ineyard was assignable to the purchaser 
of the vineyard, llS nothing in the eontl·net language excluded the" idea 
of performance by another," and (p. 287) there was "nothing in the 
nature or cireumstances ... wllich shows that the skill or other personal 
quality of the party was a distinetive charaeteristic of the thing stipu· 
latE'd for, or a mnterial inducpment to the contraet.") 
In Prichard v. Kimball, supra (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764-765, next cited 
by the majority, the written contract contained language showing the 
intent tbat it be nonassignable (as already pointed out bereinabove). 
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belief that there is substantial value to be gained for the credi-
tors from this asset of the bankrupt. Yet the majority opinion 
permits defeat of the trustee ano of the creditors through the 
device of an asserted collateral oral agreement that the option 
was" personal" to the bankrupt and nonassignable" in order 
to keep the property in the family"!14 
It also seems appropriate to inquire as to the rights of plain-
tiff wife in the optioll which shc holds with her bankrupt hus-
band. Is her interest therein also subject to being shown to be 
personal and not salable or assignable? And, what are her 
rights and those of her husband in the ranch land itself, if 
they exereise their option to purchase it T Will they be free to 
then sell the land? Or, if they prefer, may they hold it beyond 
the reach of creditors? Or can other members of "the family" 
claim some sort of restriction on it in perpetuity, established 
by parol evidence 1 
And if defendants sell the land subject to the option, will 
the new owners be heard to assert that the option is "per-
sonal" to the optionees, "in order to keep the property in the 
Mastm'son family"? Or is that claim" personal" to defend-
ants onlyT 
These are only a few of the confusions and inconsistencies 
which will arise to plague property owners and, incidentally, 
attorneys and title companies, who seek to counsel and protect 
them. 
I would hold that the trial court ruled correctly on the 
proffered parol evidence, and would affirm the judgment, 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March 6, 
1968, und the opinion was modified to read as printed above. 
McComb, J., and Burke, .J., were of the opinion that tIle peti-
tion should be granted. 
Simmons v. Zimmerman (1904) 144 Cal. 256, 260·261 [79 P. 451, 1 Ann. 
Cas. 850], held that a contract to buy land was assignable, as approval 
of title by the buyer is not a personal privilege attaching only to tIle 
assignor (the part.y to whom the scller agreed to sell). La Rue v. 
Groezinger has already been shown not to support the majority's proposi-
tion here. And the last case which the majority cite, Coykendall v. Jack· 
.~on (1936) 17 Ca1.App.2d 729, 731 [62 P.2d 746], involved a contract 
for personal services, almost uniformly held to' bc nonassignable; it did 
not deal with a contract or an option to buy property, which ordinarily 
imposes no other obligation on the buyer than to 'make payment, as does 
thc option now before this eourt. 
HAs noted at the outset of this dissent., it was by means of the bank-
rupt's own testimony that defendants (the bankrupt's sister and her 
husband) sought to show that the option was personal to the bankrupt 
and thus not transferable to the trustee in bankruptcy. 
